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Murray v. United States: 
The Court Takes Another Swipe 
At The Warrant Requirement 
The protection afforded by the warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment and 
the use of the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy for unlawful searches and seizures 
have been significantly reduced by the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Murray 
v. United States. I Although somewhat 
overlooked because of a flurry of decisions 
during the final weeks of its term involv-
ing other important issues such as the con-
stitutionality of the independent counsel,2 
the ability of states to execute minors,3 and 
the right to confront victims in child sex-
abuse cases,4 the Court's opinion in Mur· 
ray is a most significant one. 
Stated most succinctly, Murray holds 
that when the police acting with probable 
cause but in violation of the warrant 
requirement discover evidence of a crime, 
that evidence will be admissible if the 
police later obtain a search warrant 
without using the information gained dur-
ing the unlawful search. Essentially, the 
Court's approach is to treat the first 
unlawful entry and search as if it never 
happened, so that the police are placed in 
a position "no worse off"5 than if that 
search had not been conducted. The pur-
pose of this article is to show how this 
approach strikes directly at the purpose 
behind the warrant requirement and runs 
precisely counter to the avowed goal of the 
exclusionary rule, which is the deterrence 
of illegal police activity. 
The facts of Murray are largely undis-
puted. Federal agents observed two vehi-
cles, operated by the defendant and his 
co-conspirator,' drive into a warehouse in 
South Boston. Twenty minutes later the 
same two vehicles, driven by the same 
individuals, emerged from the warehouse. 
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Shortly thereafter these two vehicles were 
stopped and pursuant to a lawful search 
found to contain marijuana. The agents 
then forcibly entered the warehouse and 
observed large burlap-wrapped bales 
which were later found to contain marijua-
na. The bales were left undisturbed, and 
the agents secured the warehouse until a 
warrant was obtained. This warrant, 
signed eight hours after the unlawful 
entry, was apparently obtained without 
the use of information gained through that 
entry. During the search conducted after 
the warrant was issued, the police seized 
270 bales of marijuana and other incrimi-
nating evidence. Some of this evidence had 
been discovered during the previous 
unlawful entry and some was seen for the 
first time during the warrant-based search.6 
F our years earlier in the case of Segura v. 
United States/ the Court had decided in a 
factual situation similar to Murray that evi-
dence uncovered for the first time during 
the post-warrant search was admissible, 
because the discovery of that evidence had 
a source independent of the original 
unlawful search (the independent source 
rule). The Court in Segura, however, speci-
fically left undecided the question of the 
admissibility of the evidence discovered by 
the unlawful pre-warrant search and, in 
fact, suggested different treatment for such 
evidence.8 In Murray, however, the Court 
rejected the need to treat the evidence seiz-
ed pursuant to the unlawful entry any dif-
ferent than the evidence discovered after 
the warrant is obtained. 
In treating the evidence discovered 
before the warrant is obtained the same as 
that obtained after the warrant is issued, 
the Court held that the independent 
source exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies to both types of evidence. In so 
doing the Court negated the significance of 
the fact that the bales of marijuana had 
already been discovered and seized9 prior 
to their seizure by independent lawful 
means. Contrary to the Court's holding, 
the seizure of tangible evidence in viola-
tion of the warrant requirement, as 
occurred in Murray, should preclude the 
use of the independent source rule and lead 
instead to consideration of the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery. 
The Murray Court correctly observed 
that the independent source rule has been 
applied to "evidence acquired by an 
untainted search which is identical to the 
evidence unlawfully acquired." 10 In support 
of this position, the Court cites Justice 
Holmes' well known opinion for the 
Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States. 11 Comparing the facts of 
Silverthorne and the language quoted by 
the Murray Court from Holmes' opinion 
reveals a crucial distinction from the Mur· 
ray case. 
In Silverthorne, government agents, after 
arresting the defendant, seized documents 
from his office in violation of the warrant 
requirement. Even though the documents 
were later returned to the defendant, the 
government sought to use information 
acquired from the documents in its prose-
cution.12 In its decision, the Court estab-
lished the derivative evidence rule 
declaring that not only the illegally seized 
evidence but any information derived 
from it cannot be used by the prosecution. 
As noted in Murray, however, the Court in 
Silverthorne went on to say: 
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"Of course this does not mean that the 
facts thus obtained become sacred and inac-
cessible. If knowledge of them is gained 
from an independent source they may be 
proved like any others (emphasis add-
ed)."IJ Justice Holmes referred to "knowl-
edge" or "facts" as the kind of evidence 
which although discovered illegally can be 
admissible if later learned through inde-
pendent lawful means. 
Limiting the application of the indepen-
dent source rule to intangible evidence 
when the government seeks to apply it to 
the same evidence seized first unlawfully 
and later legally is sensible for several 
reasons. First, as the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit observed in 
United States v. Silvestri, 14 intangible evi-
dence, such as information, cannot be seiz-
ed in the manner in which tangible 
evidence is seized.15 Facts cannot be 
possessed or controlled in the same way as 
a tangible item, and these facts can be 
learned or "seized" an infinite number of 
new ways. A tangible item can be seized at 
one moment only (unless of course control 
of the item is surrendered and later 
reasserted, which did not occur in Murray). 
Therefore, tanjcible evidence cannot be 
"reseized" without, in effect, pretending 
the original seizure did not occur. 
Although the Court dismisses this 
approach as "metaphysical,"16 it surely is 
preferable to one based on the illogical 
notion of reseizure of an object, the con-
trol of which was never surrendered. 
The consequence of the Murray Court's 
approach to reseizure of tangible items is 
the likelihood of even more undesirable 
and absurd results. What, for example, 
should occur if prior to the issuance of a 
search warrant, the police remove the 
evidence discovered during an unlawful 
search? Can this evidence later be "reseiz-
ed" in the inventory room at the police 
station? If, as the Court maintains, tangible 
evidence is treated the same as intangible 
for purposes of the independent source 
rule, then, since the location of the discov-
ery of intangible information is no bar to 
its admissibility, it should not be so for 
tangible evidence either .. Further, if the 
sole criterion for admitting the evidence is 
that its lawful discovery was genuinely 
independent of the prior illegal discovery, 
such could still be the case even where the 
evidence is moved.17 If evidence seized and 
removed to the police station after an ille-
gal search is saved by the independent 
source rule, the policy of "search and seize 
first and obtain a warrant later" will be 
legitimated. 
The Court should have rejected the con-
cept of reseizure of tangible evidence nec-
essary for application of the independent 
source rule in Murray and considered 
instead whether the doctrine of inevitable 
discovery should be applied. The doctrine 
of inevitable discovery or hypothetical 
independent source rule allows for the 
admissibility of evidence seized unlawfully 
when the government can show the likeli-
hood that it would ultimately have 
acquired the evidence by lawful means. 18 
Such was the case in Nix v. Williams l9 
"Facts cannot be 
possessed. .. in the 
same way as a 
tangible item . .. " 
where the defendant was induced, in viola-
tion of his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel, into divulging where he had left the 
body of his murder victim.20 The Court in 
Williams ultimately allowed evidence 
from the body at trial because it concluded 
that a large scale search for the victim 
would have uncovered the body eventual-
ly.21 In Murray, the Court could have said 
that, given the existence of probable cause 
and the pre-entry inclination of the police 
to seek a warrant, the evidence would have 
been discovered eventually through lawful 
means.22 While such an application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine would be 
premised on a more sensible and honest 
approach to the exclusionary rule 
(although just as damaging to the purposes 
of both the exclusionary rule and the war-
rant requirement), the Court may have 
chosen to use the independent source rule 
for reasons related to differences in the 
application and the nature of the two doc-
trines. 
Had the Court applied the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery to the facts of Murray, 
it would have raised even greater questions 
concerning the breadth of its holding. For 
example, if the police illegally enter a 
dwelling and seize evidence but never 
obtain a warrant, will the evidence be 
admitted if it can be shown that the police 
ultimately intended to get a warrant and 
that in fact such a warrant would have 
been issued? The doctrine of inevitable dis-
covery arguably should be applied to such 
a situation especially since failure to do so 
would place the police in a "worse posi-
tion" than if the illegal search had not 
occurredP Such a holding, however, 
would likely reduce the number of times 
the police seek a warrant.24 
Perhaps an important difference 
between the nature of the independent 
source and inevitable discovery doctrines 
contributed to the Court's opting for the 
former in Murray. When the independent 
source rule is applied, the evidence has in 
fact been discovered through lawful means 
independent of the previous illegality. As 
the causal link between the illegal act and 
the discovery of the evidence has largely 
been severed, it is reasonable to look at the 
exclusionary rule as being inapplicable.25 
When the inevitable discovery doctrine is 
applied, however, the seizure of the evi-
dence is through unlawful means alone 
and the exclusionary rule is clearly 
applicable. Admission of the evidence 
would then require overcoming or satisfy-
ing the exclusionary rule by examining the 
costs and benefits of exclusion in a specific 
situation.26 Primarily, the difference 
between the two doctrines reflects the dis-
tinction between defining the limits of the 
exclusionary rule on one hand and describ-
ing its values on anotherF While consider-
ation of the limits of the exclusionary rule 
when applying the independent source 
rule to warrant avoidance situations calls 
for an examination of the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule and warrant require-
ments, application of the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine makes the need for such an 
examination of values even more acute. 
With the above in mind, it becomes 
important to examine the values at stake in 
the Court's decision to admit evidence 
seized initially during a search conducted 
in violation of the warrant requirement of 
the fourth amendment. 
The primary purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter unlawful police 
activity.28 The defendant in the Murray 
case argued that admitting the evidence 
seized during the unlawful entry of the 
warehouse would remove this deterrent 
impact upon the police and in fact would 
give the police an incentive to violate the 
warrant requirement. The defendant 
claimed that police possessing probable 
cause would routinely enter dwellings 
without search warrants, secure in the 
knowledge that if evidence of a crime was 
found, a warrant could safely be obtained 
later. If no evidence was found, the time 
and effort needed to obtain a warrant 
would be saved.29 The Court's response to 
this argument was to note the unlikeli-
hood that a police officer would risk evi-
dentiary suppression by entering illegally, 
"since his action would add to the normal 
burden of convincing a magistrate that 
there is probable cause the much more 
onerous burden of convincing a trial court 
that no information gained from the illegal 
entry affected either the law enforcement 
officer's decision to seek a warrant or the 
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magistrate's decision to grant it."JO The 
Court's response is disturbing for two 
reasons: first, because its overestimation of 
the burden placed on the officer who acts 
without a warrant skews its assessment of 
police incentives and deterrence; and 
second, because the result of its response is 
essentially a merger of the probable cause 
and warrant requirements of the fourth 
amendment, effectively eviscerating the 
latter. 
These consequences can most easily be 
seen by looking at what undoubtedly will 
be a not uncommon situation in the post-
Murray criminal law. A police officer, arm· 
ed with information from two reliable 
informants, decides to enter a suspect's 
house without a warrant. He tells his ser-
geant of his plan and his intention to 
obtain a warrant after the search is com-
plete. The officer finds drugs, then obtains 
a search warrant from a magistrate and 
reseizes the evidence. Clearly this evidence 
should be admissible under Murray as the 
officer ultimately seized the evidence 
under a warrant obtained without any 
information gained from the unlawful 
entry and which he always intended to 
seek. Let us now weigh the deterrent 
impact on this officer regarding his 
decision to enter and search before seeking 
a warrant. 
Not presenting the probable cause to a 
magistrate before the search was not much 
of a risk for the officer since his conclusion 
that he had probable cause is likely to be 
a correct one, especially after Illinois v. 
Gates. J1 If his assessment of probable cause 
is incorrect, he has lost nothing since he 
would have been unsuccessful in obtaining 
a warrant, and at least he has removed 
some drugs from the community. The 
"more onerous burden" alluded to by the 
Court was satisfied by demonstrating that 
the reliable informants communicated to 
the officer before the entry and by the offi· 
cer's stated intention to seek a warrant. 
The Court made it particularly easy to 
prove the officer's inclination to obtain a 
warrant by rejecting Justice Marshall's 
proposed requirement that at least the offi· 
cer should have to point to some histori· 
cally verifiable fact, e.g., that the warrant 
process had already been initiated in some 
form prior to the unlawful entry. JZ This 
officer, therefore, could have overcome 
this burden merely by expressing for the 
first time at a suppression hearing his pre-
search intention to seek a warrant, and 
such would have been sufficient to meet 
the officer's burden unless the "facts 
render those assurances implausible." 
Contrary to the Court's assertion, there is 
little to deter the officer from searching 
first and obtaining a warrant later. There-
fore a deliberate, unreasonable decision to 
avoid the warrant requirement, arguably 
the kind of police action requiring the 
highest level of deterrence,)) has been 
legitimated. 
The second result of the Court's 
approach lies in the direct attack of this 
decision on the purpose behind the war-
rant clause of the fourth amendment. The 
warrant clause is designed to insure that 
magistrates will be interposed between the 
forces of government and the individual 
suspect.)~ These magistrates are charged 
with the responsibility of forming their 
own opinions as to whether probable 
cause exists prior to the time that the 
government is permitted to intrude into 
those areas protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Post hoc judicial determinations of 
"Murray ... will 
reduce the value of 
the exclusionary 
l " ru e . .. 
probable cause in situations where war-
rants are clearly required result in an aban-
donment of the magistrate's role as a buf-
fer between the state and its citizens.35 No 
amount of probable cause can by itself sat-
isfy these concerns addressed by the war-
rant clause. By removing the magistrate as 
a buffer, the Court has effectively merged 
the warrant clause and the probable cause 
requirements resulting in the inevitable 
diminution of the warrant clause. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in 
Murray v. United States is an unfortunate 
one in its misapplication of the indepen-
dent source rule. This decision will 
weaken the protection afforded by the 
warrant requirement and will reduce the 
value of the exclusionary rule as a deter-
rent to unlawful searches and seizures. 
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